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Abstract:The authordescribes public educationthroughthe media and training
for government officials and for journalists undertakenas part of economic
reform efforts in the Republic of Georgia of the formerSoviet Union. The article concludes with a discussion of the necessary conditions for success of these
broad-basededucationalefforts.
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The economies of the Soviet Union were sick beforethe demise of Communism
and took a turnfor the worse afterthe USSR split into 15 separaterepublics.The
patients fell into depression accompaniedby greaterunemployment,inflation,
povertyand their complementarysocial ills. WesternadvisorsprescribedPILLS:
privatization,investment,liberalization,legislation (to establishthe rule of law),
and stabilization.There is controversy,however, over the dosage, which was
recently summarizedby Stiglitz (1999). Shock therapyrequireslarge doses of
PILLSover a shorttime, and gradualisminvolveslow doses over an extendedperiod. Nevertheless,Westerneconomists generallywould agree thatPILLSare necessary for the restorationof economic growthand futureprosperity.
Unfortunately,the patients do not share the Westerndoctors' confidence in
PILLS. Communistpropagandatransmittedthroughthe media and schools glorified the productivityof Soviet workersand factories,the securityof life isolated from the West, and the "free"governmentservices including electricity and
health care.At the same time, the propagandistscriticizedcapitalismfor its high
crime rates, monopolistic exploitation,and macroeconomicinstability.The propagandawas repeatedso often that it took on the statusof truth.Contradictions,
such as high Westernliving standardscould always be attributedto capitalistic
imperialism.Even if the averageSoviet citizen did not believe all the propaganda, survivalin a Marxist totalitarianregime requiredadoptionof a Soviet mindset. Laws were unnecessary;just follow the orders of those in authority,and if
one wantedto benefit from the orders,then do the bosses a favor.Do not make a
decision; leave it to the higher authorities.Avoid makingrecommendations,giving specific answers, and taking responsibility; these actions could lead to
Craig R. MacPhee is a professor of economics at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln(e-mail:
cmacpheel@unl.edu),former Senior EconomicAdvisorto the Ministerof Finance in the Government
of Georgia, and Chief Economist, InstitutionalReformand the Informal Sector Caucasus Center,
Tbilisi. Marah Ovakimiandeserves creditfor superb translation.
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Siberiaor worse. Betterto do nothing,to act like everyoneelse, and to speakwith
vagueness and ambiguity.There were no privatepropertyrights, so you helped
yourself to public property.Successful party officials advanced with big new
constructionprojects;never mind the operation,maintenance,and repairof the
existing capital stock.
Because productiongoals were usually quantitative,no one bothered about
quality. Because prices were set, there was no interest in monetary policy.
Because virtuallyall inputsand outputswere allocatedby the government,there
were no concerns abouttaxes, expenditures,and fiscal deficits. Because external
trade was mostly prohibited,there were no worries about tradedeficits or tariff
revenue. Because every importantdecision was made in Moscow, government
officials in the republics were unconcernedwith policymaking.And the public
was cynical about the behavior of governmentofficials. Because the republics
resented Moscow, the local governmentofficials and state enterprisemanagers
were more intent on limitationof exports to other republics than on fulfillment
of Moscow's five-yearplans.
These attitudesmake PILLS alone inadequatefor reformin the formerSoviet
Union, because, as Fischer (1999) has noted, successful transitionrequires a
broad consensus supportingimplementationof reforms. These attitudescan be
changed through education, but they also make educational efforts difficult.
Reformers have been slow to appreciatethe role of education in transitional
economies, but broad-basedefforts have been organizedwith increasedfrequency in recent years.Visitingprofessorsin universities,Muskie fellowships for students, and exchange programsbetween Western and Eastern institutions have
been fundedfor many years.Advising governmentofficials also involves educational efforts in seminarsand tutorials.The new emphasisis on public education
through the media: trainingfor journalists, coordinatedpress conferences and
interviews,publicationof reportsand information(GEPLAC1998), call-in radio
programs, and advertisingon television. I provide some illustrationsof these
educationalefforts and conclude with a discussion of the necessary conditions
for theireffectiveness.The illustrationsarepresentedin the context of some hard
lessons taughtby recent economic events in Georgia.
EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS
Lesson 1: Open Economies Are Subject to External Shocks
After independence,Georgia was cut off from rubles previously supplied by
the Russian centralbank. In 1993, the governmentof Georgia ignored warnings
from the World Bank and InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) (International
MonetaryFund 1995-98) and beganprintingcurrencycoupons so fast thatprices
rose by 7,488 percent in 1993 and by another6,474 percent in 1994. After the
introductionof a new currency,the lari, in 1997, however,responsiblemonetary
policy eventuallyeliminatedinflationand preserveda stable dollar/lariexchange
rate of 0.75 in early 1998.
Public confidence in the lari was shatteredby the Russian financial crisis of
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August 1998. The lari plummetedto $0.50 duringthe first weekend in September, and Georgian newspaperswere soon full of stories variously blaming the
devaluationon Georgia'sdependenceon tradewith Russia, on the incompetence
of Georgian governmentofficials, on unscrupulousforeign exchange retailers,
and on manipulationby a bankingoligopoly. The Georgianmedia reflectedSoviet attitudesagainst internationaltrade, against pro-marketreformersin government, and againstexploitationby financialcapitalists.
The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) quickly raised interest rates on interbank credit (the equivalentof our federal funds rate) from 22 percentto 38 percent, intervenedin the small foreign exchangemarketby selling $15 million, and
announcedits intentionsto stabilize the exchangerateon television.The lari rose
back to $0.74 within days, but media coverage of this episode demonstratedthe
need for more widespreadand reliable economic educationin Georgia.
The InstitutionalReform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) center in Georgia
respondedwith a reportexaminingthe economic links between Russiaand Georgia (MacPhee 1998a). This report pointed out that Russia accounted for only
one-fourth of Georgian exports and that these amounted to only 1 percent of
Georgia'sgross domestic product(GDP), hardlya vehicle to wreakhavoc on the
Georgianeconomy. Georgianimportsfrom Russia were mainly naturalgas, electricity, grains, and machinery,items with price elasticities low enough to lower
Georgia's import spending in the aftermathof the ruble devaluation.The main
difficulty createdby the Russian crisis was one that had not been mentionedin
the press. At least 200,000 Georgians (one-tenth of those employed) earned
income in other partsof the formerSoviet Union and made remittanceshome of
income equivalentto 5 percentof Georgia'sGDP.The Russianrecession would
lower those remittances.The decline in demandfor the lari, therefore,could be
explained by expectationsof recession in Georgia ratherthan by evil doings in
the foreign exchange markets.
Nevertheless, the NBG used the crisis as an excuse to shut down 343 of the
465 currencyexchange booths thatoperatedin Tbilisi, the capitalcity thathouses almost one-thirdof the Georgianpopulation.The NBG's move would obviously increasethe marketpower of the remainingbooths, which were associated
with a few dominantbanks.This anti-competitiveaction, however,was opposed
by donor countries and internationalfinancial organizationsand most of the
exchange booths were allowed to re-open.Lobbyists continuedto press the government for stricterlicensing regulations, requiringbullet proof glass, and so
forth,thatwould driveup the costs of operatingsmall booths and thus drivethem
out of business.
Lesson 2: Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms Work
Between its introductionin 1995 and September1998, the lari had only depreciated 9 percentagainst the dollar,but this was a result of the IMF's willingness
to finance relatively small balance of payments deficits. The NBG had spent
$172 million defending the lari in 1997, but it had not had to interveneat all in
1998 until the September 1998 crisis. By the end of October 1998, the lari fell
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brieflyto $0.67, the NBG had only $100 million left in reserves,andthe IMF was
threateningto cut off the stabilizationfunds because the Georgiangovernment
had not collected as much tax revenueas it had agreed to do. This situationprovoked wild commentaryfrom governmentofficials and from the media that the
lari would go into free fall, and the Georgian economy would collapse. Again,
the old Soviet ignoranceof equilibratingmechanismsin marketswas manifest.
The IRIS centerin Tbilisi respondedwith anotherreportthatexaminedthe various componentsof Georgia'sinternationalpaymentsand calculatedthat the balance of paymentsdeficit was doubling in size (MacPhee 1998b).A simple elasticities approachwas used to estimatethatthe dollarvalue of the lariwould fall 40
percentif no stabilizationfunds were receivedfrom externalsources.This would
be a substantialdevaluation,but the reportnotedthatit was not out of line with the
recentexperienceof othertransitionaleconomies, and40 percentwas hardlya free
fall. The reportdid not eliminatesensationalismin the media, but the lari did fall
about40 percent,and since then, it has fluctuatedaroundthatlow level.
Lesson 3: Instability Hinders Growth
The reporton the devaluationof the lari also explainedthe effects of the devaluation on inflation, on the burdenof Georgia's large foreign debt, and, perhaps
most important,on Georgia'sfledgling financial sector. In the absence of stock
and bond markets, banks were the main source of funding for local business
investment. After independence, many defunct state enterprisesformed bank
subsidiaries,and as many as 229 banks in 1995 existed with less combinedcapital thanone mid-sized Americanbank. Most of these so-called banks had made
loans to insiders who promptlyfled with the money, so their assets were often
worthless.Moreover,the governmenthad frozen deposits duringthe hyperinflation of 1994, certainlynot a policy to inspire confidence in potentialdepositors.
Consequently,Georgians kept their monetary wealth in dollars hidden under
floorboards,and the banks were largely unableto performtheirrole of financial
intermediation.Bankruptcyand consolidation,encouragedby NBG enforcement
of minimumcapital requirementsand other regulations,reducedthe numberof
banks to 47 by 1998. Only 22 were consideredto be viable and they accounted
for almost all the deposits and currentlending in Georgia.
The concentrationin banking made this sector a naturaltargetfor the media
and the politicians who decried the low interest rates on deposits (averaging
about 14 percent during the first half of 1998), the high interestrates on loans
(about 37 percent), and the supposed manipulationof the exchange rates. The
devaluationreport(MacPhee 1998b) attemptedto explain that devaluationactually weakenedthe bankseven more.They were requiredto hold lari reservesthat
lost relative value and nervous depositors were making withdrawals.Thus, the
abysmally low level of bank lending would fall even lower in an economy that
desperatelyneeded more investment.
Risk and inflationaryexpectations were keeping loan interest rates high and
also explainedthe large spreadbetween deposit and loan rates.The links among
the exchange rate,inflationaryexpectations,and the government'sfailureto colWinter2001
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lect taxes also needed emphasis.In the absence of a bond marketandIMF funds,
the NBG would be underpressureto monetize the deficit, actions that the public rememberedas leading to the hyperinflationof 1994. Inflationaryexpectations increasedthe demandfor dollars and kept downwardpressureon the value
of the lari.
These principles of economics were presented to about 40 journalists who
attendeda three-dayworkshopsponsoredby the WorldBank in December, 1998
(MacPhee 1998c). The workshopalso covered tradeliberalizationand the implications of WTO accession for Georgia,privatizationin the energy sector,private
lending activities of the InternationalFinance Corporationand of subsidized
Westernbanks, as well as sessions devotedto journalismissues.
The discussion of media issues turnedout to be revealingas conflicts surfaced
between the new private, and mostly young, journalists and the old state-run
broadcastersand publishers.After the middle-agedproducerof a stateradionews
series described some of her public informationprogramson reforms,she was
deridedby the youths. The young journalistscriticizedher hypocrisyas a former
communist, the tedium of her program(which the youths claimed had low ratings), and her biased reporting on reforms, reforms that the cynical youths
regardedas ineffectual.This criticismof the slow reformspresentedan opportunity for discussion of the economic concepts of long-rungrowth and short-run
instabilitywith emphasis on the centuriesit took for the marketsystem in Western Europe to develop. Nevertheless, the seminardid not succeed in dispelling
the cynicism of the young journalists.
Lesson 4: Deficit Monetization Leads to Currency Depreciation
The need for journaliststo learnaboutthe harmfuleffects of fiscal deficits was
evident. The WorldBank sponsoreda second three-dayworkshop,the European
Union sponsoreda semester-longcourse in Tbilisi; the Academyfor Educational
Developmentwith USAID funds sent eightjournaliststo CaliforniaState University at Chico for coursesincludingmacroeconomicsand microeconomics,and the
USAID-fundedBarentsGroupFiscal ReformProjectheld weekly seminarsduring spring 1999. Economic advisorsalso offereda three-weekcourse on macroeconomics to 35 futuregovernmentofficials in the mastersprogramof the new
GeorgiaInstituteof PublicAdministration,a programfundedby the UnitedStates.
Reporting on the importanceof fiscal reform improved and the media expressedmore skepticismtowardgovernmentofficials who blamedtheirfailureto
collect more tax revenueon the bad weatherand the Russiancrisis.A publicopinion surveyindicatedthatthe public was gettingthe message.About92 percentbelieved thatcorruptionwas an impedimentto collecting taxes and 82 percentsaid
thatthey would pay theirtaxes if everyoneelse did. Seventy-twopercentfelt that
tax rates were too high, however, and most thoughtthatrevenueswere going to
pensionersand the police ratherthanto theirhigh priorities:educationand health
care. Despite the increasedpublic awarenessof the causes and consequencesof
deficits, the rate of tax collections actuallyfell in late 1998.
On December 4, 1998, the NBG gave up its defense of the lari and, as noted
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previously,its value fell about40 percent.This unleasheda torrentof wild statements in the media, reflecting either economic ignoranceor demagoguery.The
press reportedimmediate price increases of 60 percent, stirringup fears of a
resumption of runaway inflation. The volatility of the lari's exchange value,
which bobbed up and down between $0.47 and $0.63 a dozen times in the first
two monthsof floating, also contributedto uncertainty.Of course, the press was
full of stories blaming the ups and downs on conspiracies among banks,
exchange dealers, and corruptgovernmentofficials. A jump in kerosene prices
was attributedto a cartel controlled by Nugzar Shevardnadze,the president's
nephew,insteadof the onset of cold weatherand a decreasein electricitysupply.
The time was right for more exercises in public education.In December 1998,
U.S. advisors went on a radio call-in show, and in February1999, the IRIS center issued another report explaining the reasons for volatility and the links
between inflation, devaluation,and the fiscal deficit (MacPhee 1999a). One did
not need conspiraciesto explain volatility.The exchange marketfor the lari was
very thin, and it was drivenby expectationsthat changed with each bit of bad or
good news from Russia or the IMF. People held more dollars than lari, but they
would change into lari for transactionssuch as holiday shopping,therebycausing temporaryappreciation.Monetarypolicy had tightened afterthe September
crisis, but governmentspending financed by the National Bank led to a 22 percent increase in the lari money supply in December 1998. The reportconcluded
that "Nothingwould bolster the lari like a big increasein tax collections."
Both the Februaryreportand a subsequentIRIS study (MacPhee 1999b) disputedthe runawayinflationclaims. The IRIS staffcarriedout an independentsurvey of the most importantitems in the Georgianconsumerprice index (CPI) and
found that the CPI was fairly accurate.In the first two months afterthe devaluation, the CPIrose only 15 percent.The reportsof 60 percentinflationwere bogus.
Lesson 5: Taxes Plus Collections Equals Revenue
Shortly after issuance of the Februaryreport,the United States announceda
narroweremphasis for technical assistance efforts with concentrationon just a
few areas, the most importantone perhapsbeing tax collections. The American
ambassadorvisited with the Georgianpresidentto gain his assuranceof cooperation, andthe fiscal reformprojectbegan a muchmore aggressiveprogram.Most
of the fiscal reformactivitiesinvolved retrainingtax inspectors,reorganizingthe
tax department,and overseeing the implementationof new policies such as
excise tax stamps.
The IMF had long insisted on increasesin tax collections. Higherrevenuewas
favored by USAID, the Georgian parliament,and the Georgianpresident.The
Ministry of Finance in prior years had issued budgets based on optimistic projections of tax revenue, in partto set high goals for the independenttax department. But there had never been any systematic effort to estimate the size of the
tax bases that should be the foundationof serious projections.The responsible
government officials needed to be educated on the methods that economists
would use to estimate the size of the tax bases.
Winter2001
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Advisors from the U.S. Treasury,the IMF, and the USAID-funded Barents
GroupFiscal Reform Projectmet with officials of the State Departmentof Statistics, the MacroeconomicForecastingDepartmentof the Ministryof Finance,
the ParliamentBudget Office, members of the ParliamentBudget Committee,
and the Ministry of Economy. The main problemfacing estimation of potential
tax revenue turnedout to be the lack of reliable statistics on the economy. The
Department of Statistics and most ministries were full of Soviet-era apparatchiks even though the leaders were young, sometimes with American training in economics. The apparatchiks were used to sitting back and receiving
often-erroneous and usually unaudited reports from state enterprises, which
they would then aggregatein orderto issue their quarterlystatisticalreview for
the republic.
The StatisticsDepartmentstaff were not doing what one normallythinksof as
economic statistics.They had little awarenessof samplingtechniquesor statistical inference.When advisorsdemonstratedto them how the travelcomponentof
the currentaccountcould be estimatedwith a shorttelephonesurveyof 20 active
hotels in Tbilisi (MacPhee 1998d), the staff respondedwith a 10-pagequestionnaire for 1,000 (mostly defunct) hotels in Georgia and a proposal for a law
requiringthe hotels to file the reportmonthly.At this point, the advisors gave
them a short lesson on cost-benefit analysis that unfortunatelydid not halt the
bureaucraticmomentumbehindthe comprehensivequestionnaire.
Despite years of intermittenttraining by IMF and European advisors, the
national income accounts and trade statistics were still unreliable. The World
Bank, however, had installed some former statistics professors in the Department of Statistics in orderto do a fairly reliable household survey. Thus, some
reasonably accurateinformationon consumptioncould be pieced together with
some of the more reliable productiondata using the internationaltrade identity: consumption = production- exports + imports.Fiscal advisors demonstrated to the Georgiansthe ways in which they could estimate the tax bases for customs duties and excises on cigarettes, gasoline, and alcohol, as well as the
value-addedtax (MacPhee 1999c-h). Eventually,they agreed to form an interagency working group that would employ these methods on a regularbasis to
introduce more realism into the Georgian budget. Most of the estimates were
astounding.The foregone revenue from cigarettesalone would have covered 40
percent of the total governmentbudget deficit. The tax collection rate on petroleum productswas only 44 percent, and collection of VATwas only 48 percent
of potential.
Fiscal advisors also worked with the Ministriesof Finance and Economy on
the subjectof forecastingrevenues(MacPhee 1999i,j). Here the previouseducational efforts of a series of short-termadvisorsfrom the U.S. Treasury,the IMF,
and the WorldBank had gone astray.Forecastingseminarshad been offered to
the staff, and computerhardwareand softwarehadbeen provided.Afterward,the
staff spent their time constructingmodels using datafrom unreliabletime series,
none longer than four years. Then they would issue their wildly over-optimistic
forecasts without disclosing anythingaboutthe model.
With sensitivity to the emotionalinvestmentsome of the Georgianstaff had in
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their forecasting work, the fiscal advisors took a very low-key approach.U.S.trainedGeorgian advisors worked with the forecasting staff to document their
model, to review the unreliable data and, in the process, to suggest improvements. The advisors also explained the importanceof careful interpretationof
forecasts in light of their inevitable inaccuracies.The staff of the Ministry of
Finance seemed to react favorablyto this approach,but it will not be until future
budgets are formulatedthat we will be able to assess the outcome.

Lesson6: EconomicPrinciplesAppearon Television
To encourage the compliance of taxpayers and the re-election of reformers,
the USAID funded an extensive public education campaign with a series of
television messages in the summer of 1999. The television messages were
scriptedand producedby Georgians and, like commercial messages, they were
short and superficial. Nevertheless, each of the messages reflected a principle
of economics, althoughnot all were principlesthat are commonly emphasize in
American classrooms.
Here are the lessons that the television messages attemptedto communicate:
People need to make choices. People need to be adaptablebecause economic
growthrequireschange, a point illustratedvisually by a steam locomotive being
transformedinto a bullet trainandby a VW Beetle being transformedinto a racecar. Growthwill benefit futuregenerations,a message reinforcedby a scene of
the Pilgrim ships giving way to the lunarlanding.The Americanmarketsystem
is worthyof emulation,demonstratedby scenes of the Manhattanskyline. People need to cooperate and work together in the new system in order to accomplish theirgoals, illustratedby armiesof workersbuildingthe pyramidsin Egypt
and by two cartoonspacemenworkingcooperativelyon an alien planet.Reform
is a long process but it has a lot of momentumand there is no going backward,
symbolized once again by the locomotive transformedinto bullet train.World
marketsare competitive and competitorshave to move fast, again demonstrated
by the transformedVW racingarounda speedway.The main purposeof taxation
is to finance public goods, a message backed up with pictures of Georgia's natural scenery and wildlife, historicalmonuments,roadways, and school children.
Tax evasion hurts all of us by denying public goods to ourselves. The obvious
free riderproblemwas ignored until the last message aboutpenalties for failure
to pay taxes, illustrated by a scene of tax inspectors confiscating cases of
unstampedcigarettesand alcohol.
These were basic messages, some might even say platitudes,but public opinion surveyshad revealedwidespreadpublic ignoranceaboutthe reformprocess.
The television messages addressedthe fundamentalideas thatmarketsare a form
of cooperationand that governmenthas a legitimate role in a marketeconomy.
Whether the messages accomplished their goal, however, is an open question.
The pro-reformcoalition in parliamentmanagedto maintainits majorityin elections at the end of October 1999, and excise tax collections rose in the late summer and early fall of 1999. However,tax collections again fell in late 1999 and
the IMF again began withholdingstabilizationfunds.
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CONCLUSIONS
Althoughthis articleis confinedto broad-basededucationaleffortsin only one
of the 15 republicsof the formerSoviet Union, a similarneed for economic education exists in most other transitioneconomies. After a decade of reform,there
is still widespreadbelief in the outmoded Soviet ideas of isolationism, government control, capitalistic exploitation and instability. These ideas impede the
process of reformby providinga rationalefor governmentpolicies that are inefficient, fiscally and monetarilyirresponsible,anticompetitive,and inflationary.
These ideas also foster corruptionamong poorly paid governmentofficials and
cynicism among the citizens.
The technical assistancecommunityhas graduallybecome awareof the barriers to reformerected by the old ways of thinking.This awarenesshas motivated
the recentemphasison educationthroughadvisinggovernmentofficials, training
journalists,and providingaccurateinformationto the generalpublic.These educational efforts have faced theirown shareof difficulties:mistakesin translation,
lack of continuity,overly sophisticatedconcepts, and poor coordinationamong
the various agencies providingtechnical assistance.
Economic educatorsin transitioneconomies need to place more emphasison
the very basic ideas of scarcity,choices, shortrun, long run, and tradeoffs.They
need to stress the importanceof accuratemeasurementof economic variables.
They need to give repeatedexplanationsof the sources of change and the equilibratingmechanismsin marketeconomies. They need to clarify the roles of competition, propertyrights, and stable governmentpolicies. Finally, they need to
remindthe local citizens as well as the technical assistancecommunitythat the
reform process is a long one. The evolution of the market system in Western
Europedid not take place overnight,and one should not have unrealisticexpectations that the presenteconomic reformswill take less than a generation.
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